IRWIN A. SCHIFF, : CIVIL NO. 3:9CV166(JAC)

Plaintiff,

V. :

PETER C. DORSEY et al.,

Defendants. : JANUARY 13, 1995

Plaintiff moves that this Honorable Court reconsider its order of December 30, 1994 for the following reasons:

1. A Glaring But undoubtedly Inadvertent Omission Was Made by this Honorable Court When It Handed Down Its Decision

However, before turning to this “glaring omission,” plaintiff wishes to clarify a few other inadvertent errors made by this Honorable Court in its 12//30/94 ruling. For example, this Honorable Court repeated the fiction raised by defendants that “Plaintiff was convicted in 1985 of three counts of attempted tax evasion.” This Honorable Court apparently overlooked the article appearing in the February, 1987 issue of “The Journal of Taxation” (which plaintiff supplied to the Court as Exhibit A of his “Reply to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss”), which pointed out that the Plaintiff was “convicted” only after defendant Dorsey instructed the jury that it could convict plaintiff of tax evasion even if the government did not prove the act of evasion he was charged with committing - which, the article pointed out, violated the Spies Rule and “settled law for over 40 years.” And this criminal jury instruction was criminally affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals because Judges Meskill, Kearse and Metzner apparently have as little regard for truth, law, and their oaths of office as does defendant Dorsey.

Also in its Ruling of January 30th, this Honorable Court declared that:

Summary judgment shall be granted, if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits...show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

However, this Honorable Court apparently forgot that it barred plaintiff from securing those very interrogatories and admissions by issuing a “protective order” without giving any reasons for doing so, and before allowing plaintiff time to object - which shielded defendants from having to come forward with the truth, and protected them from having to reveal by way of interrogatories and admissions their individual and collective culpability. Obviously, if this Honorable Court had any interest in truth, it never would not have issued its “protective order,” which prevented plaintiff from securing the discovery to which the law and the facts in this case entitled him. Therefore, the alleged basis for granting a summary judgment - even on these enumerated grounds did not exist- because of the specific action taken by this very Court.

Further on, this Honorable Court claimed that it “Must view the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” However, the record shows that the Court took an opposite tack. It disregarded and/or misstated every fact at issue ( and even those not in issue) and all relevant law so as to concoct conclusions “in the light most favorable” to those seeking the summary judgment instead of this plaintiff, who opposed it. This allowed this Honorable Court to issue a ruling in favor of its friend and colleague Peter C. Dorsey and the other defendants, all of who - like the Court - work for the same corrupt government.

For example: Plaintiff’s primary claim against judge Dorsey was that he sentenced plaintiff to a term of imprisonment for allegedly violating the terms of his probation, without providing plaintiff with the counsel required by law. And this primary allegation the government never denied. So, Judge Dorsey’s failure to supply plaintiff with the counsel required by law - was an uncontested issue of fact in this litigation. Indeed, a discussion of this very occupied no less then 13 pages of Plaintiff’s 34 page “Reply to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss” or approximately 40% of that Reply Brief. Therefore, based upon this uncontested fact, plaintiff pointed out to this Honorable Court that the Supreme Court had ruled that , in such instances, “The denial by a court of the right guaranteed a defendant...to have assistance of counsel for his defense defeats the jurisdiction of court to render a judgment of conviction.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458

How could this Honorable Court, therefore, in its 16 page Ruling have overlooked entirely plaintiff’s fundamental claim on this issue - and not even mention it in its 16 page ruling? And how could this Honorable Court have claimed, given this undisputed fact and the Supreme Court’s holding with respect to it, that Judge Dorsey had “absolute immunity” when Johnson v. Zerbst - and a host of other decisions, clearly hold otherwise? Indeed, even this court stated on page 4 of its ruling that a judge is not immune from suit “when the suit stems from judicial actions taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction.” Therefore, plaintiff’s suit against Peter Dorsey was totally justified since - as the record shows - he had no jurisdiction to impose sentence because he failed:

a) to provide plaintiff with the assistance of counsel which plaintiff requested and which the law required him to furnish, and because

b) he failed to conduct the “revocation hearing” required by law.

It should be noted that Congress never included in 42 USC 1983 and 1985 any provision exempting Federal fudges - on any basis - from civil rights law suits. Federal judges have, arrogantly, lawlessly, and conveniently, simply exempted themselves - even though the Constitution gives them no authority to either make or change laws. However, they do so all the time by enforcing, as law, not the statutes passed by Congress, but their own lawless decisions. Consequently, Federal judges are able to lie and steal with impunity, as the instant ruling demonstrates. This Court, by dismissing - without right - a law suit which it knows should go to trial, has stolen from plaintiff at least $2,000,000.00 which any jury would have awarded him. I hope that this Honorable Court can live with the fact that it has undoubtedly sent a number of person to prison, for stealing a whole lot less.
 
 

This is why, of course, this Honorable Court did not even mention plaintiff’s first claim since there is no conceivable way it could have dismissed plaintiff’s law suit once this issue was confronted. So this Honorable Court simply ignored this issue in its entiretyas if it had never been raised. And nobody reading the Court’s egregious decision would ever suspect that the plaintiff had, indeed, raised it. Which is precisely why neither the public nor “law” in general should given any credence to the Federal court decisions - especially those emanating from the Second Circuit - since it is impossible to tell from them just what issues were actually raised by the litigants involved.

Why, therefore, doesn’t this Honorable Court - in the interest of truth and justice - explain in a Reconsidered Opinion how it could have overlooked plaintiff’s first claim IN ITS ENTIRETY and not even mention Peter Dorsey’s FAILURE TO SUPPLY COUNSEL in its Ruling of 12/301994?

2. As to Whether or Not a Revocation Hearing was Ever Held In Connection With Plaintiff’s Revocation of Probation.

In its Ruling of 12/31/94 this Honorable Court deliberately repeats the falsehood contained in the Government’s motion for a summary judgment, which was that plaintiff contended in his complaint “that Judge Dorsey conducted the plaintiff’s probation revocation hearing improperly...” As plaintiff emphatically pointed out to this Honorable Court in his Reply Brief - plaintiff contended no such thing. Plaintiff sought to correct the government’s false and self-serving claim on this issue in his Reply Brief, as follows:

Plaintiff (doesn’t) claim that judge Dorsey conducted the “revocation hearing improperly”; he (claims) that the record will show that Judge Dorsey “conducted” NO REVOCATION HEARING AT ALL, as required by Rule 32.1 - and that without such a hearing, he had no subject matter jurisdiction to sentence plaintiff to a term of imprisonment.

Apparently even capitalizing plaintiff’s actual claim for this Honorable Court did no good, since this Honorable Court still managed to incorporate in its ruling the Government’s false one, rather then the truthful, factual claim made by plaintiff. As proof that no revocation hearing ever took place, plaintiff submitted to this Honorable Court the entire 43 page transcript of the hearing held on May 31, 1995, in which Judge Dorsey continually identifies that hearing as being only a “preliminary” one, only to determine “probable cause”, and that a “full (revocation ) hearing” would follow. Plaintiff also submitted to this Honorable Court, Peter Dorsey’s Ruling of July 26th in which he specifically identified the “hearing” held on July 31, 1991 as being only a “probable cause hearing”. While at the “hearing” held on November 25th, no witnesses were called - and plaintiff was never timely notified of any such “hearing”, nor was the nature of that “hearing” ever identified. Indeed, to further prove that no revocation hearing was ever held, plaintiff asked, as part of discovery, - which this Honorable Court conveniently, for the benefit of defendants, quashed - that defendant Dorsey produce any document or order that would have identified any hearing held with respect to plaintiff’s alleged probation violation as being a “revocation” hearing. And no such document was ever furnished to this court - while the only documents in evidence prove that no “revocation” hearing was ever conducted. In addition, since at a revocation hearing - as pointed out by this Court on page 11 and 12 of its instant decision - a defendant has a right to:

1. be represented by counsel,

2. call witness in his defense,

3. question adverse witnesses, and then

4. appeal any adverse ruling.

and since Plaintiff contended that the was denied his right to counsel, denied his right to call witnesses in his defense (as Dr. DePino’s affidavit proves), denied his right to question adverse witness, and even denied his right to appeal (all of which the government did not attempt to refute by submitting any contrary evidence), this Honorable Court, therefore, had absolutely no factual basis to claim, ON BEHALF OF ALL OF THE DEFENDANTS, that a revocation hearing was ever held. Yet this Honorable Court did so no less than eight times in its egregious Ruling.

In discussing this aspect of Petitioner’s claim this Honorable Court also made the following observations.

In short, the probation officer’s filing of a petition for probation action merely sets into motion a complex adversarial process presided over by a neutral, independent decision maker, with safeguards that are just as extensive as in the presentence context.

Unfortunately these “safeguards” are placed in the hands of judges who, the record - including the instant ruling - show, have absolutely no regard for these “safeguards” nor, indeed, for truth or justice in general. So these “safeguards” only exist on paper. How could plaintiff’s alleged probation violation have been conducted by a “neutral, independent decision maker” when it was conducted - as this Court well knows - by a “Judge” who is revealed in plaintiff’s latest book to be a judicial fraud, with as much right to be a federal judge as he has to be a brain surgeon; which calls for his removal from the federal bench, if not his incarceration; and who refused to recuse himself as law, equity, ethics, and 28 USC 144 required him to do? And, as proof of Peter Dorsey’s perfidy, Plaintiff submitted to this Court all three of his rulings - together with a complete hearing transcript - so that the Court could see with its own eyes the numerous and blatant falsehoods they all contained, and which would prove to anyone of average intelligence that plaintiff’s alleged probation violation was never heard in any “court of law” nor presided over by any “judge,” as those terms are understood in America. So precisely which of these issues were viewed by this Court, as it claimed, “in the light most favorable” to plaintiff?

The above, by no means, exhaust all the false claims made by this Honorable Court in favor of Peter Dorsey, but this sample, plaintiff contends, alone warrants a reconsideration by this Honorable Court of its ruling of December 31, 1994.

3. With Respect to the Court’s Dismissal of This Action as Against Asst. U.S. Attorney Peter Jongbloed.

The Court begins by pretending to truthfully state plaintiff’s actual complaint against defendant Jongbloed, as follows:

The complaint next alleges that AUSA Jongbloed knew of Judge Dorsey’s purported violations of plaintiff’s rights and nonetheless still pressed for the revocation of plaintiff’s probation. See Complaint at 6-7.

From this, the Court comes to the following legal conclusion:

It is well established that “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from civil suit for damages under 1983.” All of defendant Jongbloed’s actions fall squarely within the ambit of prosecutorial activity covered by absolute immunity. (Three citations omitted)

Entirely missing from this Honorable Court’s account of plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Jongbloed was the one appearing in paragraph g. of page 7 of plaintiff’s complaint, which states as follows:

Carmello Medina testified, in connection with a “Supplemental Petition” for probation action, that Peter Jongbloed informed him that Plaintiff was in violation of the conditions of his probation, and that information formed a basis for his supplemental charge that plaintiff was in violation of the conditions of his probation.

And the Government never disputed nor denied plaintiff’s allegation in this issue.

The legal significance of this undisputed fact was covered in plaintiff’s Answer to the government’s request for summary judgment, as follows:

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993), was based upon a similar claim to what is being alleged here: “the action...(of a) prosecutor, who moved to dismiss based on their claim of absolute immunity,” but which the Supreme Court rejected. In doing so, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between a prosecutor “(1) giving legal advice to the police...and on whether probable cause existed to arrest the suspect, and (2) participating in a probable cause hearing, and the Court held that the former was not entitled to absolute immunity. The instant case is right on point here. In the instant matter AUSA Jongbloed gave “legal advice” to Carmello Medina that the tax returns plaintiff filed on 10/13/1990 did not comply with the terms of plaintiff’s probation, and provided probable cause upon which he could base his supplemental Petition...(and) ...Those returns had not been taken into consideration by PO Medina when he filed his original Petition.

Therefore, AUSA Jongbloed can not claim prosecutorial immunity with respect to the giving of such advise to USPO Medina. Of course, he also knew that the advice he gave was false on a variety of grounds - as covered in plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss (excerpts of which are included in Exhibit L) - a copy of which he received on May 31, 1990, or at least a month before he gave his “advice” to USPO Medina.

So how could this Honorable Court have omitted addressing this claim against defendant Jongbloed, and the Supreme Court’s holding with respect to it? Is this how this Honorable Court viewed all “inferences” and “facts in the light most favorable” to plaintiff, as it claimed to have done in its order?

4. With Respect to the Court’s Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Law Suit Against Probation Officer Carmello Medina

It is instructive to note that the Court devoted 9 of its 16 page decision to this lower ranking Federal employee - who, the record conclusively shows, was guilty of committing outright perjury. However, missing from the court’s lengthy discussion of PO Medina, and the role he played in this affair, were the following facts:

1. PO Medina was not petitioner’s probation officer and plaintiff was not under his probation supervision, since plaintiff was then living in New Your City and was under the probation supervision of PO Patrick Walsh of the Eastern District of New York - who never claimed that plaintiff had violated any of the conditions of his probation. However, the Court mentions and/or infers that PO Medina was plaintiff’s probation supervisor no less than 38 times in its Ruling.

2. PO Medina had admitted - before a witness - that he actually did not know what had been plaintiff’s probation “conduct” nor what his “attitude” was, even though he swore under oath, inn his Petition for Probation Action (which initiated the probation action against plaintiff), that he did.

It is instructive to note that the Court was able to claim that PO Medina had absolute immunity to commit perjury, even though such Supreme Court decisions as Bivens, 403 US 388, Haifa, 112 US 358, Harrow, 457 US 800, and other cited by plaintiff, and just plain common sense, indicate that such an “immunity” does not - and could not - exist. However, the Court, with cabalistic artistry, verbally wove together some 31 court decisions which allegedly proved that he had such immunity. This, of course, only proves that Federal judges have an inexhaustible supply of case “law”, to allow them to contrive, concoct and justify just about any kind of decision they feel like making.

 
And the Court’s instant decision will allow other Federal judges to cite the instant ruling, if it is not withdrawn, as “proof” that Probation Offices have absolute immunity to commit perjury in “Petitions for Probation Action.” A skeptic, however, might ask, “Then why are probation officers required to make such Petitions “under oath”? What purpose or deterrent does the “under oath” serve?
 
 

5. With Respect to the Court’s Dismissing Plaintiff’s Law Suit Against IRS Agent Robert Netcoh.

In fabricating a basis for dismissing the law suit against IRS Agent Netcoh, this Honorable Court wrote:

The complaint alleges that Agent Netcoh improperly urged the probation office to seek revocation of the plaintiff’s probation. See Complaint at 2, par. 2.

A law enforcement officer seeking to an arrest warrant is entitled to qualified immunity. Because Agent Netcoh’s alleged actions in seeking to initiate probation revocation proceedings by reporting plaintiff’s illegal activities are functionally identifiable as protected action of a law endorsement agent, Agent Netcoh is similarly immune form suit. As in the case of USPO Medina, the district court’s final judgment that the plaintiff indeed violated his probation establishes as a matter of law that Agent Netcoh did not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights in recommending that the probation office seek revocation of plaintiff’s probation.

What the Court did here was simply to adopt the false claim (IRS Agent Netcoh was no “law enforcement agent”) and fraudulent reasoning offered by the Government in its Motion To Dismiss, while totally ignoring plaintiff’s answer in opposition, which stated, in relevant parts, as follows:

Again, defendants misstate and misrepresent plaintiff’s charges against Agent Netchoh. Plaintiff never contended that he “improperly urged the probation office to seek revocation of the plaintiff’s probation.” Plaintiff alleged that Agent Netcoh, “ a mere revenue Agent” had neither the “delegated authority” nor “expertise” that “would have permitted him to contact plaintiff’s probation officer” in the manner he did. And it was his “false and unauthorized letters” which, “provided the basis” for the “plotters to contrive an alleged probation violation” - which led directly to the injuries sustained by plaintiff at their hands. These totally “false and unauthorized” letter, and Netcoh’s fraudulent and presumptuous use of them is more fully covered in plaintiff’s six page reply to him (with copies going to defendant Dorsey and USPO Walsh) as shown in defendants’ Memorandum, Exhibit 2.

Therefore, plaintiff made no “allegation” that would “essentially” place Agent Netcoh “in the position of a law enforcement officer (witnessing a crime in progress and) seeking an arrest warrant.”...Far from being “in the position of a law enforcement officer” in this affair, Agent Netcoh was nothing but a pip-squeak IRS agent who pretended he had the knowledge and the authority of a judge, with the delegated authority to determine when an how plaintiff violated the terms of his probation, and to arrogantly and officially contact plaintiff and his probation officer with respect to that determination.

Agent Netcoh presumed to act in a “official capacity”. He sent letters to both plaintiff and his probation officer on official IRS stationary and purported to act in an official capacity. He claimed (as if he had official capacity to do so) that, “I have determined that they (plaintiff’s first set of tax returns) are not valid Form 1040 Individual Income Tax Returns...This letter is your notice that you have failed to file your Federal Income Tax Returns for the years 1980 through 1988). You are here Notified that the Internal Revenue Service considers you NOT in compliance with the terms of this Order.” All of these claims were obviously designed to make it appear that this letter was sent under this official capacity to make such claims and give such notices. While, in reality, Agent Netcoh had no more expertise nor authority to do so than my garbage man. However, if my garbage man did it, PO Carmello Medina could not pretend to give them any credibility. he could, however, pretend that Netcoh’s official looking and official sounding letter had credence (when they did not) and therefore, contrive a violation based on them.

Thus, since defendant Netcoh held himself out - and was viewed by the other plotters - as actin in a “official capacity,” he must suffer the consequences for having done so.

Defendant’s claim (page 6) that the “Court’s final adjudication of the plaintiff as having violated his probation establishes, as a matter of law, that Agent Netcoh did not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights in recommending that the probation office seek such a revocation” advances the novel theory that the lawless acts of one criminal can nullify the lawless acts of another criminal. It is clear from the record that defendant Dorsey would have, with equal justification, found plaintiff guilty of kidnapping the Lindbergh baby, if that’s what was required to get plaintiff incarcerated, so he couldn’t be free to promote a book that exposed Judge Dorsey’s true, criminal character.

Plaintiff has provided this Honorable Court with sufficient evidence to prove that plaintiff’s alleged probation violation was never lawfully “adjudicated” by any court of law, as that term is used and understood in a America. And this novel defense proposes that the Honorable Court accept as a fact what is essentially at issue in this law suit; namely that no court ever determined the issue of plaintiff’s allege violation, but, that plaintiff was framed - under color of law, in defendant Dorsey’s kangaroo court - with the help of defendant Netcoh and others.

Thus, this Court dismissed plaintiff’s law suit against IRS Agent Netcoh by again misstating allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, by creating facts that do not exist, by employing self-serving, cabalistic reasoning, and by disregarding all of the facts and evidence furnished to the court in connection with Netcoh.

6. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

Before closing his Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiff would like to address two other claims made by the Court in its ruling because they particularly call attention to the unabashed dishonesty of the Court’s ruling.

On page 3 the court states that the party opposing a summary judgment may not "rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment" and that:

The non-moving party may defeat the summary judgment by producing sufficient facts to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial and that mere conclusory allegations or denials in legal memoranda or oral argument are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact where none would otherwise exist. (citation omitted)

Apparently this is a technique employed by the federal judges to create the impression that they actually intend to follow the principles outlined in the case “law” they cite. In actual fact, this Court disregarded every fact and every piece of evidence supplied to it by plaintiff - whereas the defendants supplied absolutely no evidence at all to the court. Plaintiff supplied the Court with an actual transcript of the “hearing” held on May 31, 1991, docket sheets of the proceedings, all of the rulings issued by defendant Dorsey, and even affidavit from Dr. Frank DePino certifying that Judge Dorsey refused to allow him to testify, since his testimony would clearly establish the perjury committed by PO Medina. Dr. DePino was prepared to testify with regard to statements made by PO Medina at the time he served plaintiff with the Petition for Probation Action. As his affidavit indicated, he was prepared to testify that at that time PO Medina admitted to being unfamiliar with the actions, attitude, and case “law” that plaintiff had relied on when he filed “zero” income returns for the years at issue: that based upon his newly found knowledge, he indicated that he no longer believed that plaintiff ad violated the conditions of his probation; but that “It was too late to do anything about it now, because his Petition had already been filed”; but by “showing the returns and case law that supported them to Judge Dorsey, plaintiff would be all right.”

In addition, the transcript that plaintiff submitted to the court proved that practically every claim made by Peter Dorsey as to what happened at that hearing was a lie; from his claim that plaintiff had initially agreed to represent himself, to his claim that he advised plaintiff of his “right to counsel” and that he subsequently ruled that plaintiff had “waived his right OT counsel”. Both the transcript and docket sheets proved that these claims and numerous others made by Peter Dorsey were all blatant lies - as well as proving that no revocation hearing was ever held. But this Honorable Court chose to ignore all of this evidence - even though it claimed that it would view all evidence “in the light most favorable to” plaintiff since that is the only lawful basis upon which it can award a summary judgment: proving that this Court has not only ignored all of the facts in this case, but is ignoring the law as well. In addition, this Court, granted a summary judgment in favor of defendants without even allowing for oral argument, as requested by plaintiff.

In addition, the Court never required defendants to answer any of the claims contained in plaintiff’s complaint while further protecting them from having to answer the interrogatories and admissions that would have proven that plaintiff’s allegations were not “merely conclusory” but grounded in concrete. The evidence supplied to the court proved this anyway, but the admissions and interrogatories furnished to defendants would have forced all of them to basically admit to there own criminality and civil culpability. Fortunately for them, they had this Court to protect them.

For example, this Court protected AUSA Jongbloed from having to admit or deny that “He never saw in plaintiff’s Conditions of Probation any requirement that the was required to file income tax returns as a condition of his probation,” the very alleged infraction for which plaintiff was sentenced to two years imprisonment by “Judge” Dorsey. Defendant Jongbloed was also asked to admit or deny that “to the best of his understanding plaintiff had never waived his right to counsel” and that “when he read Peter Dorsey’s claim in his Ruling of June 3, 1991 (which claimed) that at the hearing held on May 31, 1991, plaintiff, at lest initially...expressed an intent to represent himself he recognized that such a claim was a false one.” Plaintiff sought to illicit the following information, by way of interrogatories form PO Medina. “You signed plaintiff’s Petition for Probation Action on Tuesday, April 23, 1991. Please state the approximate day when you first considered violating plaintiff.” “Did you discuss violating plaintiff with any other party prior to April 23, 1991?; If so, please identify those persons.” “In your career as a probation officer, have you ever violated a probationer whom you were not supervising and whom you had never spoken to in your life? If so, approximately how many times did this occur?” “In what manner and by whom were you first informed that plaintiff’s probation supervision was something that you should concern yourself with?” “Were you ever given written, official notice that plaintiff’s probation supervision was being transferred from PO Walsh, plaintiff’s New York PO, to you?” “Did somebody tell you to violate plaintiff, or was that our own independent idea? If somebody told you to violate plaintiff, please identify who that individual was.” Among other things, Peter Dorsey was asked by way of admission to admit or deny that when he sentenced plaintiff to two years imprisonment for allegedly not filing income tax returns “he was fully aware that he did not make the filing of income tax returns a condition of plaintiff’s probation”; that “he was fully aware that all return information can be used against those who file;” that he was “fully aware that Plaintiff had a constitutional right not to be a witness against himself” that he was “aware that neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the US Criminal Code contained any criminal penalties for not filing income tax returns,; that he was “aware that the Supreme Court had defined the word “income” as used in Title 26, to mean a corporate profit,” that when he sentenced plaintiff to a two year term of imprisonment “he was fully aware that the plaintiff had written and published a book highly critical of him as a judge”; and that “he knew that Camello Medina had falsified his Petition for Probation Action...by claiming that his Petition was based upon “the conduct and attitude of probationer.” These and other interrogatories and admissions submitted to these four defendants would have conclusively revealed that they had conspired to get plaintiff imprisoned for a violation that never occurred, and which was not even a condition of his probation; that they criminally conspired to do this in order to prevent plaintiff form promoting a book that was highly critical of Judge Dorsey and other member of the Federal establishment with who they were associated. The evidence of this criminal conspiracy was overwhelming - but this Honorable court chose, for obvious reasons, to ignore it, while claiming to consider these issues “in a light most favorable to” plaintiff.

And finally this Court stated on page 12 that “only after the plaintiff was given full benefit of due process did the court determine that he violated the conditions of his probation, and therefore ordered him incarcerated.”

That this court could make such a claim while knowing full well that plaintiff:

1. was denied the assistance of counsel;

2. never received the revocation hearing required by law;

3. was not allowed to call a material witness in his behalf;

4. was not allowed to examine adverse witnesses;

5. was incarcerated for violating a condition which was not even included in his conditions of probation, and which, in any case, he fulfilled by filing three separate sets of income tax returns for all the years at issue, with the final set - filed under duress - resulting in the IRS imposing over $600,000.00 in fines and penalties on plaintiff.

6. was violated, not by his own probation officer, but by another whom he had never met and who committed perjury in preparing the Petition for Probation Action; and that

7. the issue of plaintiff’s alleged violation decided by a “Judge” with a strong, personal motive to see plaintiff incarcerated;

8. who blatantly lied in every ruling he issued (as is fully verified in the record) and who;

9. refused to recuse himself even thought he law and professional ethics required it;

means that not only was the issue of plaintiff’s alleged probation violation not heard by any court - as that term is understood in America - but neither was this law suit.

Therefore, in the interest of truth, justice, and this Court’s reputation, plaintiff moves that this Court reconsider its instant ruling and issue another, based on truth, law, and the facts in this case. If this Court allows the instant ruling to stand, plaintiff fully intends to bring it, together with a few others, to the attention of the Senate and House judiciary committees as an example of why federal judges should not be allowed to issue summary judgments, especially in cases involving the government and/or other public employees. The Court’s instant decision is so blatantly egregious that plaintiff can not understand how a federal judge with an otherwise distinguished judicial career and who has been considered for appointment to the Supreme Court, would allow his reputation to be stained with it. Peter Dorsey’s hide simply isn’t worth it.

Respectfully submitted,

Irwin A. Schiff, pro se
4616 W. Sahara, #340
Las Vegas, NV 89102
702-877-2833

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing has been mailed, postage prepaid this 17th day of January, 1995 to: Carl J. Schuman, AUSA, 450 Main St., Room
328, Harford, CT 06103.
 
 

Irwin A. Schiff