The following analysis of the District Court decision (or Order) and
the sustaining decision of the 9th Circuit shows that all the arguments
contained in both are blatant nonsense. The introduction to my Petition
lists some 14 statutes that specifically require the making
of assessments in various situations. There are numerous other statutes
that I could have listed, but it was unnecessary. These 14
statutes alone reveal the fraud involved in both decisions.
I also address some of the specific statutes that mandate the making of
assessments further on in this analysis.
Let us examine the specific authorities relied upon in both decisions.
The District Court based its decision on only two sources:
one statute, 26 U.S.C. 6151 and one court decision, Moran v. U.S.
63 F. 3d 663 - both of which have absolutely nothing to do with either
the law or facts in this case, as the following will prove. In connection
with the Court's reliance on 26 U.S.C. 6151, I wrote, as follows, in my
opening Appeal Brief to the 9th Circuit:
|
WITH RESPECT TO CODE SECTION 6151:
Apart from Moran supra, the only other authority
that Judge Pro cites to support his novel theory that assessments don't
count is Code Section 6151. Judge Pro bases his claim on paragraph
6151(a), which states as follows:
| Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, when
a return of tax is required under this title or regulations, the person
required to make such return shall, without assessment or notice
and demand from the Secretary, pay such tax to the internal revenue
officer with whom the return is filed, and shall pay such tax at the time
and place fixed for filing return (determined without regard to any extension
of time for filing the return). |
However, when we examined Section 6151, the following was
reveled:
1) Section 6151 is a totally benign statute,
having no force and effect of law whatsoever as related to income
taxes.
2) If anything, it can only apply to certain excise taxes
appearing in CFR 27.
3) And, the plaintiff complied fully with the provisions
of Code Section 6151 even though the statute does not apply to him
or to income taxes.
Attached, as Exhibit E, is the “Privacy Act Notice”
that appears in the income tax, 1040 booklet. The only Code Sections that
the Government claims are related to the payment of income taxes - and
the only statutes the public is directed to obey - are Code Sections 6001,
6011, and 6012. (These sections are examined at the completion of
our comments on Section 6151.)
Obviously, if Code Section 6151 had anything to do with
income taxes, it would have been included in the Privacy Act Notice along
with these statutes. This fact alone proves that the Government's
reliance on Code Section 6151 is misplaced, contrived, and totally without
merit.
Additionally, both Code Sections 6001 and 6011 notify
the public that they need only “comply with (such) regulations as the Secretary
may from time to time prescribe,” or do something “when required by regulations…”
Nothing in this statute notifies the public that they are required to comply
with the statutes themselves - such as 6151 - or that they have to comply
(or pay attention to) court decisions involving litigation in which they
took no part, such as Moran, supra. So, again, the Plaintiff's
are not bound by Moran, but only a legislative, Treasury
regulation
“having the force and effect of law.”
The fact that Section 6151 has nothing to do with income
taxes is further established in Exhibit F. This is an excerpt from the
Parallel Table of Authorities which shows that the implementing regulations
for Code Section 6151 is in CFR 27, the Code of Federal Regulations dealing
with “Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms”, in parts “17, 22, 25, 53,
194, 270 and 290.” There is no entry here that shows that any implementing
regulation for this statute exists in CFR 26, the Code of Federal Regulations
dealing with income taxes. This is further proof that Code Section 6151
has absolutely nothing to do with income taxes but is only related to the
payment of alcohol, tobacco and firearms taxes.
However, even if we go to CFR 26 we will find a totally
benign regulation in connection with this statute that appears there: it
is Reg. No. 301.6151-1. It is a totally benign regulation because no legislative
or other authority is shown as being the authority
for this regulation. The regulation itself says nothing
anyway. Since it says (and I quote the entire regulation) as follows:
| "For provisions concerning the time and place for paying tax shown
on returns with respect to a particular tax, see the regulation relating
to such tax." |
THAT'S IT! All this regulation does,
is to tell you to search out the regulation for a “particular tax” and
“see” what
that regulation tells you! But this regulation
itself tells you nothing. It says absolutely nothing about
income taxes, let alone contain a requirement that income taxes are required
to be paid on any basis. So, obviously, this statute and
its bogus regulation (since no legislative support for the regulation is
shown) are totally benign, at least as far as income taxes are concerned.
But in any case, Plaintiff even complied
with this irrelevant statute and its bogus regulation - since both the
statute and the regulation deal with the payment of taxes, (as specifically
worded in the regulation, and implied in the statute) “shown on a return”
Plaintiffs did just that: they “paid” the exact amount of taxes “shown”
on their return which was “due and owing.”
The “amount” shown as taxes “due” on their return was
“zero” and that is exactly what Plaintiff paid with their return
- “zero.” Therefore, Plaintiff complied with this statute
and “paid” “without assessment or notice and demand from the Secretary”
the amount of taxes “shown” on their return - just like the statute requested.
However, since Plaintiffs had already erroneously overpaid the amount “shown”
on their return by $5,158.39, they requested a refund for that amount.
Plaintiff complied with all of the benign provisions of Code Section 6151
and its bogus regulation. Therefore, for Judge Pro to suggest that Plaintiffs
violated any of the provisions of this benign statute (while he blithely
proceeds to violate some fifty others dealing with the need for making
income tax assessments) is incredulous to say the least.
In addition to everything else, Code Section 6151 cannot
apply to the provisions of Code Section 31(a)(1). And based upon this statute,
Plaintiffs are entitled to a refund for all of the reasons already stated. |
In connection with Judge Pro's reliance on Moran v. U.S. I argued
in my opening brief to the 9th Circuit as follows:
Judge Pro bases his irrational claim on two, irrelevant
sources: Code Section 6151, and Moran v. U.S., 63 F.3rd 663. Section
6151, as the following will show, is a totally benign statute
having nothing to do with either income taxes or the wage taxes at issue,
while the facts and issues in Moran are not only totally unrelated
to the facts and issues involved in this case, but Moran, itself,
proves that income taxes are being unconstitutionally exacted.
Since all mandatory, federal taxes must be collected either on the basis
of apportionment or on the basis of geographic uniformity, Moran
demonstrates that income taxes are being collected differently in the Fifth
and Eight Circuits from how they are being collected in the Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth and Federal Circuits. Therefore income taxes are - admittedly
- being exacted neither on the basis of apportionment, as required in Article
1, Sections 2 and 9, Clauses 3 and 4, nor on the basis of geographic
uniformity as required by Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 - and, as such,
their
exaction can not be made mandatory.
Thus it is undeniable, that based upon Moran -
income taxes are admittedly not being enforced on the basis of geographic
uniformly. Therefore, since neither income taxes (nor the “wage”
tax at issue) are not being
enforced either pursuant
to Rule of Geographic Uniformity nor the Rule of Apportionment, the taxes
at issue are not being
enforced pursuant to either
class of taxes authorized in the Constitution: therefore, the United States
can not retain the funds at issue, since Plaintiffs can not be compelled
to pay a federal tax which is not enforced pursuant
to one constitutional rule or the other. |
My Petition for Certiorari makes the same argument,
but is reinforced with the Ott decision as follows:
As petitioners pointed out in their appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, Moran v. U.S., 63 F.3rd 663 as relied on by the trial court
proves that income taxes are being unconstitutionally exacted. Since
all mandatory, federal taxes must be collected either on the basis of apportionment
or on the basis of geographic uniformity, Moran demonstrates that
income taxes are collected differently in the Fifth and Eight Circuits
from how they are collected in the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and Federal
Circuits.
This fact is even more dramatically revealed in Ott
v. USA, 141 F.3rd 1306 (a case relied upon by Nevada District Court
Judge Howard D. McKibben in his rejection of a refund suit similar to this
one, in Domingo Montijo et al. v. U.S., CV-S-97-01710-HDM (RLH)).
Ott
reveals
that income taxes are enforced one way in the 5th and 8th
Circuits, another way in the Fed. 3rd, 4th and 7th Circuits,
and still another way in the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuits.
Thus it is undeniable that income taxes are not being collected
either on the basis of geographic uniformity or on the basis
of apportionment, and Plaintiffs asks this Court to take judicial notice
of that fact. Obviously, plaintiffs have a constitutional right not to
be forced to pay a federal tax that is not being collected pursuant to
either one constitutional rule or the other. If the decision of the
9th Circuit is not reversed and the funds collected are not refunded to
petitioners, then it is petitioners’ claim that the income tax is being
collected unconstitutionally - since it is not being collected either on
the basis of apportionment nor on the basis of geographic uniformity.
Therefore, it is not being collected pursuant to any of the taxing clauses
contained in the Constitution. |
It is not uncommon for Federal appellate courts to disagree on issues of
law, so Federal law can be enforced one way in the 9th Circuit and yet
another way in the 2nd Circuit. (The more confusing our laws are, the more
money lawyers make; which is the real objective of America's legal system.)
While lawyers and judges apparently see nothing wrong with this, can you
imagine the public's reaction if these differences were actually
published?
Here is how the publication would read:
“This is Federal law for people living
in California, Oregon, Washington, etc. etc. etc.; whereas, if you live
in Connecticut, New York, etc. etc., Federal law is as follows”.
If these differences were actually published in this manner, (so the public
was officially notified concerning how Federal law varied from State to
State) it would reveal the utter illegality and absurdity of these distinctions.
It should be obvious that if any law generates the amount legal controversy
as revealed in the Ott decision, that law has to be declared “void for
vagueness,” with Congress instructed to write a new law that the public
can understand. Obviously, if all of these judges can't agree on
what the law is, how is the public supposed to know what it is?
Obviously, lawyers and judges see nothing wrong in this system because
it makes money for them; however, the legal profession overlooked
one thing - the Constitution specifically forbids such distinctions
when it comes to taxes! Taxes must be collected either
on the basis of apportionment, as provided for in Clauses 3 & 4, Sections
2 & 9, of Article 1 of the Constitution, or on the basis of geographic
uniformity as required by Article 1, Section 8 Clause 1. Since, admittedly,
neither the income tax nor the wage tax is collected pursuant to either
rule - there is no way the Supreme Court can rule against the
Browns (just on this issue alone), unless the Court is prepared
to toss out the Constitution as well as the entire Internal Revenue Code.
When you read the 9th Circuit's decision, you will note that it affirmed
Judge Pro's decision without even mentioning (let alone supporting) the
legal references he relied on. What does this tell you? While
Judge Pro had the decency to claim that he relied on, at least, one statute
(even if it didn't apply), the 9th Circuit has the temerity to write a
decision that, admittedly, does not rely on any statute.
What does that tell you about how “law” is enforced in the US of A?
The decision that that the 9th Circuit relied on to establish its claim
that “There is no requirement that the IRS make a formal assessment…before
payment is necessary,” is Zeir v. United States, 80 F. 3rd 1360.
This case was actually raised by the Justice Department in its argument
to the 9th Circuit. I disposed of it at that time in the following
manner:
How did the Justice Department lawyers arrive at the
novel conclusion that assessments don't count and that the Government is
entitled to keep the funds at issue absent any assessment - self assessment
or otherwise. Well they claim that they relied on the following cases:
Manning
v. Seeley Tube & Box Co: 338 US 561; Zeir v. US, 80 F.3d 1360; Moran
v. US. 63F3d 663; Laing v. US, 423 US 161; Crompton & Knowles Loom
Works v. White 65 F.2d 132; Ewing v. US 914 F. 499; Dye v. US, 121 F.3d
1399; Fisher v. United States, 80 F.3d 1576; and Loftin & Wood, Inc.
v US, 577F.2d 1206.
Plaintiffs-Appellates will not waste their time analyzing
these cases since - as the statutes (as shown below) make clear, these
decisions are all irrelevant. Beside, if any
judge ever ruled that funds such as those at issue can be kept by the government
absent any assessment or a court determination, then any such judge would
not be a judge at all, but merely a charlatan. However, in
listing these cases the government quotes Zeir v. US, supra, as
holding that “ While an assessment is thus a perquisite to (and sets
limits on) certain kinds of administrative collection activity…the United
States is authorized to collect a tax without assessment by simply accepting
a payment to satisfy a proposed or agreed liability where forcible collection
is not necessary.” Apart from this observation from Zeir stating
the obvious, it also clearly establishes plaintiffs case.
Obviously, the IRS is “authorized to collect a tax
without assessment” when taxpayers voluntary make such payments.
What is surprising about that? But this hardly means that the IRS
can compel payments when no assessment or court determinations exist.
Nothing in this quote from Zeir even suggests any such thing: yet
this is the issue at hand in this case. In addition, Zeir
refers to “a proposed or agreed liability where forcible collection
is not necessary.” None of these elements exist in the instant
case.
First of all, the funds at issue were not paid “voluntarily.”
American workers are made to believe that if they do not agree to have
taxes taken from their pay (and sign W-4’s under penalty of perjury) they
will go to jail. Indeed, many of them have gone to jail for (correctly)
claiming “exempt” on their W-4s, because praetorian judges and prosecutors
have ruled that such a legitimate claim constituted an affirmative act
of tax evasion.
Secondly, the funds at issue were not paid pursuant to
an “agreed liability.” Plaintiff's contend that there is no such thing
as an income tax “liability” as a matter of law. And even if there
were, plaintiffs would still have no income tax “liability” as a matter
of fact.
In addition, as of the date that Plaintiffs filed their
claim for refund, no agency of Government had even “proposed” a liability.
So, where was the “agreed” or “proposed” liability in the instant case
that fell within the criteria enumerated in Zeir?
In addition, the funds at issue are being “forcibly” collected.
Plaintiffs were misled and intimidated - on a variety of grounds - into
allowing the funds at issue to be withheld from their pay and sent to the
Government. When they discovered the truth, they demanded a refund
which the Defendant has refused to issue. Therefore, the funds at
issue have been “forcibly collected” on this ground as well.
Further, none of the elements of the instant case fall within the criteria
outlined in Zeir.
Rather than Zeir supporting the Government's position,
it is clear that Zeir - for all of the above reasons - SUPPORTS
THE PLAINTIFFS’ POSITION. Therefore, based on Zeir alone,
it is pointless to analyze any of the other cases cited by the Government
since, as in the case of Zeir, none of them can be any more supportive
of the Government's position then was Zeir. Besides -falsus
in uno falsus in omnibus.
Incredibly, the Government's footnote on page 10 of its
Reply Brief further establishes plaintiffs’ case. (Prompting plaintiffs
to ask, “Does the Government understand its own pleadings?”), since it
correctly states that a law suit is necessary “to collect a tax ‘without
assessment.’” This was actually covered and asserted in plaintiffs’
Opening Brief (pages 8 & 9). Since neither of these conditions
are present in the instant case, the Government has no lawful basis to
keep the funds at issue - as confirmed in the Government's own brief.
IN ADDITION, NONE OF THE COURT DECISIONS CITED BY THE
GOVERNMENT ARE BINDING ON PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
For the following reasons, none of the cases cited by
the Government can be binding on plaintiffs-appellants anyway. The Privacy
Act Notice in a 1040 booklet (Exhibit E in plaintiffs-appellants Opening
Brief) specifically directs the public to Code Sections 6001, 6011, 6012
and to none other. So we must assume that the Government, in this
manner, puts the public on notice as to what laws they must obey in matters
involving income taxes - since these are the only statutes to which the
public is directed. I would ask the Court to take judicial
notice that both Code sections 6011 and 6011 notify the public that they
need only comply with regulations. These statutes do so in the following
manner.
Code Section 6001 says, in relevant part that:
Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title…shall…comply
with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time
to time prescribe. (Emphasis added)
Code Section 6011 says, in relevant part:
When required by regulations proscribed
by the Secretary any person etc. etc. etc.
Therefore, this Court must take judicial notice that the U.S. Congress
in both statutes, 6001 and 6011, put the public on notice that they need
only comply with “regulations.” Nothing in Sections 6001 and 6011
informs the public that they must obey statutes - or court decisions involving
litigation in which they took no part. In other words, the only thing
that Congress requires the American public to obey in connection with income
taxes is Treasury Department regulations. And there is no legislative
regulation that requires plaintiffs-appellants to pay income taxes, let
alone the wage tax at issue.
So the assumption by defendant that plaintiffs-appellants
are bound by all those court decisions cited in its Reply Brief (litigation
in which plaintiff-appellants took no part) is total nonsense. The
U.S. Congress never passed a law binding Americans to litigation in which
they took no part and were not a party to. If Congress
never passed such a law, how can plaintiffs be bound by all the court decisions
cited by the Government? Indeed, if the American public were
bound by such court decisions, the American public could never know what
the law is unless they spent countless hours in law libraries looking up
hundreds of court decisions many of which are in conflict with each other.
Therefore such a claim is nonsensical on its face.
So while the public is only bound by Treasury Department
regulations, the Defendant has not cited one legislative regulationthat
would require plaintiffs -appellant to pay income taxes, let alone allow
the Government to keep the funds at issue.
What the Defendant has sought to do in the instant case,
is attempt to treat the opinions of judges as the equivalent of statutes
passed by Congress - overlooking entirely that the public is only obliged
to comply with regulations. In seeking to elevate judicial opinion
to the status of “law” which plaintiffs-appellants are supposedly obliged
to obey - the Justice Department was apparently unimpressed by the words
of John Marshall as reproduced on page 16 of Exhibit D of plaintiffs’ Opening
Brief. Therefore, it bears repeating here,
and plaintiffs ask this Court to take judicial notice of the words of John
Marshall explaining that courts are “the mere instruments of the law” and
not the “law” itself.
| "Judicial power as contra distinguished from the power
of the laws has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of
the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise discretion,
it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning
the course prescribed by law; and when that is discerned, it is the duty
of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for
the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge, always for the purpose
of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other words, the
will of the law." (emphasis added)( Osborn et al v. The Bank
of U.S., 6 L Ed. 204) |
In the instant case, the “ will of the law” is clear -
as shown by the following statutes passed by Congress. The “law,”
therefore, does not consist of the biased and often conflicting opinions
of judges (as reflected in the court decisions cited in the Government's
Reply Brief) but is contained in the following, representative statutes
- all of which have been ignored by the Government in its Reply Brief -
and in the underlying decision.
Section 6201, for example, clearly states, in relevant
part, that “The Secretary is authorized and required
to make …assessments of all taxes …imposed by this title. (Emphasis added).”
Is the Government suggesting that this statute is without force and effect
and the Secretary is not “required” to make the assessments called for
by this statute - or that the legal implication to the public is the same
whether tax assessments exist or not?
Apparently, according to the Government - and to District
Court Judge Philip M. Pro - it makes no difference whether the Secretary
follows the law or not. What purpose, therefore, does Section 6201 serve?
A simple reading of the law and common sense tells us that until an assessment
is made - no taxes can be owed. How else can this statute be read?
If taxes can be owed absent of assessments - then what purpose do assessments
serve, and why do we bother providing for them at all?
Section 6203 further provides that “Upon request of the
taxpayer, the Secretary shall furnish the taxpayer a copy of the
record of the assessment.” If taxpayers can owe income
taxes absent assessments, why would “taxpayers” bother to get a “copy
of the record of assessment” from the Secretary? What would it tell
him? How much they owed? But if they owed the same amount
absent assessments, why bother to get “a copy of the record of assessment”?
Presumably if plaintiffs-appellants wrote to the Secretary pursuant to
Code Section 6203 they would be told that they haven't been assessed for
any 1996 income taxes for that year. What possible meaning would
that information convey? That they owe taxes for 1996 anyway?
If so, how much do they owe? And who determined it, and when? If
this Court will advise plaintiffs-appellants
1. How much in 1996 income taxes they owe?
2. When that liability was determined? and
3. Who determined it?
Plaintiffs will be happy to pay that amount - as long
as the Court also provides them with a copy of the delegation of authority
of the person who determined their 1996 income tax liability, along with
the legislative regulation that requires them to pay that amount.
Further Section 6303 provides, in relevant part that “the
Secretary shall, as soon as practicable, and within 60 days, after the
making of an assessment of a tax pursuant to section 6203, give notice
to each person liable for the unpaid tax, stating the amount and demanding
payment….” However, since according to the Government taxes can be
owed absent assessments, the Secretary can presumably demand payment at
any time - whether assessments exist or not and regardless of the provisions
of this statute. If taxes can be owed absent assessments as argued
by the Government - why can't the Secretary demand payment at any
time, whether assessments exist or not?
If taxes can be owed absent assessments, does this not
mean that the IRS can seize property and impose tax liens even though no
assessments exist? If income taxes can be owed absent assessments
as the Government (and Trial Court) suggest, why can't the IRS seize property
and impose liens absent assessments? Presumably, therefore, even
though there are statutes to the contrary, the IRS is free - according
to the Government and the Trial Court - to seize property without
bothering: to make termination assessments as required by Code Sections
6851(a) and 6852(a)(1)(B); or jeopardy assessments as required by Code
Sections 6861(a) and 6862(a); and can impose liens absent assessments even
though Code Section 6322 states that “the lien …shall arise at the time
the assessment is made.”
And, of course, Code Section 6204 provides for the making
of “a supplement assessment whenever it is ascertained that any assessment
is imperfect or incomplete…” If assessments don't count, as the Trial Court
and the Government now claim, why is it important that they be corrected
if they are “imperfect or incomplete”? If assessments count
for nothing, what difference does it make if they are “imperfect” or
“incomplete.”?
In addition Code Section 6213(c) provides that “If the
taxpayer does not file a petition with the Tax Court within the time proscribed….
The deficiency…. shall be assessed, and shall be paid upon notice and demand…,”
while Section 6214 provides that the Tax Court can redetermine an amount
greater than the deficiency and that the additional amount “should be assessed
if claim therefor is asserted by the Secretary…” In addition,
Code Section 6215 provides that “If the taxpayer files a petition with
the Tax Court, the entire amount redetermined as the deficiency by the
decision of the Tax Court…shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice
of demand….” If assessments count for nothing as the trial court
and the Government claim, why would not the simple decision of the Tax
Court be enough to require payment of the deficiency? Why does
the law require that even a Tax Court's “redetermination” has to be “assessed”
before it needs to be “paid.”? If someone wins a civil law suit does the
amount awarded have to be “assessed” before the prevailing party is entitled
to collect the award? The answer, of course, is no. It is therefore
clear that for tax purposes, there must be an assessment, even after the
Government wins in Tax Court. If taxpayers are not even required
to pay a Tax Court determination until after that amount is “assessed,”
how can the Trial Court and the Government claim that Plaintiffs are required
to pay an income tax (i.e. the Government can legally keep the $5,035 at
issue as payment for 1996 income taxes) absent of either a Tax Court determination
or an assessment?
In ruling that income taxes can be owed absent assessments,
the Trial Court and the Government in its Reply brief have tossed the above
11 statutes and at least 30 others into the trash can, while seeking to
replace them with the irrelevant and jaundiced opinions of judges who may
have as little regard for the law and the Constitution as does Judge Philip
W. Pro, the trial judge in this case, and the Justice Department
lawyers who prepared the Government's Reply Brief. |
Apart from both courts making absurd claims with respect to assessments
and relying on court decisions that, at the very least, were irrelevant;
both courts refused to even address the “wage tax,” issue, much less attempt
to refute it. The following will show how I addressed the “wage tax”
issue in my Motion for Reconsideration to the 9th Circuit. I have
included my argument to the 9th Circuit (rather than the one I made to
the Supreme Court) just to show that my argument to the 9th Circuit was
extensive, yet they refused to address it in this issue.
| In rendering their decision, the Honorable James Browning,
Clifford Wallace and Edward Leavy blatantly disregarded numerous statutes
contained in the Internal Revenue Code, as well as numerous, relevant Supreme
Court decisions. The panel also blatantly ignored and disregarded
the apportionment provisions of the United States Constitution especially
as they apply to the wage tax imposed in Code Section 3402 and to
the $5,035.57 at issue.
The facts in this case are simple. Plaintiffs paid
$5,035.57 in wage taxes as imposed in Code Section 3402. This
amount was fraudulently collected by the defendant in the guise of “Income
tax collected at source” as Code Section 3402 is fraudulently captioned.
Apart from the wording of the statute itself, Code Section 6413 clearly
identifies that a wage tax is “imposed” in Code Section 3402, having nothing
to do with the income tax imposed in Section 1. Code Section 6413 states
in relevant part that:
| "If more than the correct amount of tax imposed
by section 3101, 3111, 3201, 3221, or 3402 is paid etc.
etc. etc.” (Emphasis added) |
Clearly, a wage tax is imposed in Code Section 3402,
having nothing to do with the income tax imposed in Code Section 1 or the
16th Amendment. Plaintiffs extensively briefed both the trial court and
this Court that a direct, tax on wages as imposed in Code Section 3402
would be an obvious violation of the apportionment provisions of the Constitution
as contained in Article 1, Sections 2 and 9, Clauses 3 and 4 - if it were
not refundable as provided for in Code Section 31(a)(1). Plaintiff
also extensively briefed both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit on
appeal that an unapportioned, direct tax imposed directly on wages was
obviously unconstitutional. Plaintiff pointed out in his pleadings to both
courts that a tax imposed directly on a “source” of income (such as wages)
had to be apportioned, as the Supreme Court clearly ruled in Brushaber
v. Union Pacific RR, 240 US 1, and Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust,
158 U.S., 158 U.S. 601. In upholding the lower court's granting of
a summary judgment to the Government, the Ninth Circuit (following the
lead of the trial court) ignored both the apportionment provisions of the
Constitution and the Brushaber and Pollock decisions.
In addition to ignoring the above statutes and Supreme
Court decisions, both the trial court and the 9th Circuit panel also ignored
the provisions of Code Section 31(a)(1). This statute provides that:
| "The amount withheld, as a tax under chapter 24 (which
includes Code Section 3402) shall be allowed to the recipient of
the income as a credit against the tax imposed by this title." |
In filing their 1996 income tax return, plaintiffs-appellants
showed a “zero” as the amount of income taxes they claimed was due and
owing. Therefore based on the provisions of Code Section 3402
and 31(a)(1), the “credit” they were entitled to, had to take the form
of a cash refund of the $5,035 the Defendant was holding. Clearly,
pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 6501(c)(1) it can not be contended
by either the trial court nor the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals that as
of the date plaintiffs-appellants filed their 1996 income tax return and
claim for refund that they owed more in income taxes than the “zero” shown
on their 1996 tax return. Code Section 6501(c)(1) provides
that:
| "In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the
intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed or a proceeding in court for
collection of such tax may be begun without assessment at any time. " |
Therefore, unless and until the Government assessed an amount
of income taxes against plaintiffs-appellants (in excess of the “zero”
shown on their return) as being due and owing for 1996, or secured a judgment
against them for a greater amount, as a result of a “proceeding in court,”
as provided for in Code Section 6501(c)(1) it can not be contended by this
or any other court that plaintiffs-appellants owed more in 1996 income
taxes than the “zero” shown on their 1996 income tax return.
Therefore any claim by the Government or any Court that
as of the date that plaintiffs-appellants filed their 1996 return and claim
for refund, that they owed more than the “zero” shown on their return,
would amount to a blatant and deliberate violation of Code Section 6501(c)(1).
It is clear, that if a federal court were to rule that plaintiffs-appellants
owed more in income taxes than the “zero” shown on their 1996 income tax,
despite the fact that no assessment nor any judgment for any greater amount
then “zero” exists against them, then that court would also have ruled
that Code Section 6501 (c)(1) is without legal force and effect. |
The above by no means covers all the issues and authorities covered in
my Petition and Appendix.
The bottom line is this. There is no way that the Supreme Court
can hear this case and not rule in favor of the Browns, since there is
simply no way the Court can get around the statutes, constitutional provisions
and other authorities that support the Browns’ claim for refund.
And once the Supreme Court rules in favor of the Browns, the income tax
is over.
Why?
| Because once the Supreme Court rules
that the Browns are legally entitled to get back their “withholding taxes”
every other wage earner in America can do the same thing. |
This, of course, would end the “withholding tax” - i.e. the “wage tax.”
And if “income taxes” could not be collected on a weekly basis, in
advance; almost no one in America would have the funds available to pay
the income tax the following year - overlooking the fact that by filing
a “zero” return, nothing would be due the following year anyway.
So the Brown case will end the income tax, without the Supreme Court having
to declare any law unconstitutional.
All we are asking the Supreme Court to do is to enforce the laws (and
a number of their prior decisions) as currently written. And if they
do that the income tax is over and we can put the Federal government back
in the bottle.
Now, many pessimists tell me that “the Supreme Court will never hear
this case” However, the Supreme Court must hear this case, since this is
the first time the constitutionality of the “wage tax” has been made an
issue. How can they not address this issue, especially since both
the trial and appeals court obviously ducked it? The buck stops
at the Supreme Court.
Notice I am not urging that the Supreme Court declare the wage tax is
unconstitutional. It is only unconstitutional if the Browns don't
get their refund - which they clearly have a right to, based on numerous
laws and constitutional provisions. If the Browns don't get their
refund, then the “wage tax” is unconstitutional on a variety of grounds
as clearly set forth in my Petition. The integrity of the Supreme
Court is on the line here. How can the Supreme Court allow the Federal
Government to blatantly steal the Browns’ money?
Now, some say, “The Supreme Court doesn't have any integrity
anyway.” I might agree with that, but the Supreme Court doesn't want
the public at large to know this. They still have a reputation to
maintain. However, the issues in the Brown case are so simple that
even the village idiot can understand that the Browns are entitled to a
refund. If the Supreme Court denies them that refund, then the Supreme
Court Justices are clearly involved in the obstruction of justice and violations
of their oaths of office. Can the Supreme Court really allow the
Government to collect a tax that millions of Americans (including all the
village idiots) know is being collected unconstitutionally?
All we have to do is make sure that the Supreme knows that a substantial
segment of the public knows that the Browns were entitled to the refund
that the trial and appellate courts refused - on specious grounds - to
grant them. This is a win win situation. If the Supreme Court
hears the case, we must win. If it elects not to hear this case,
the Supreme Court's reputation goes down the tubes for all eternity.
Suppose the Supreme Court justices find 200,000 or so letters awaiting
them when they return from their summer recess asking them to hear this
case? How can they not hear it? All we have to do is
make sure that they get all those letters. And with the power
of the Internet that should not be too difficult.
I have sent copies of our Petition and Appendix to the New York
& LA “Times,” the “Wall Street Journal,” the Washington “Post” &
“Times,” the “Las Vegas Review Journal, ” but none of these papers will
do a story involving a tax that no one even knows exists. So we have
to publicize the existence of this Petition ourselves. You should
e-mail copies of this material to everyone on your e-mail list. Call
up radio talk shows and talk about the Brown case now before the Supreme
Court. Until the Supreme Court “denies cert, ” it is a live
and newsworthy issue. Let's make the most of it.
Please join us in this historic event,
and get all your friends to write to the Supreme Court
at,
The Supreme Court of
The United States of America
1 First St., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20543.
The letter does need not be long. Just simply copy and paste the
following, and mail it.
As an American wage earner I respectfully request that this Court
grant certiorari in the case of Brown v. US, Docket No. 992066.
It involves a tax that effects every working American, the Federal “wage
tax”; yet no court has ever considered the legality of this tax.
Therefore, the Supreme Court must consider it now.
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You can get bound copies of the Petition and Appendix from Freedom Books.
We are asking for a minimum $50.00 contribution to help us promote and
publicize this case. We have devoted hundreds of hours moving this case
through the courts. Any financial help you want to throw our way to help
us publicize it, will be appreciated. Given the proper level of promotion,
this case will end the income tax.
One further thing. Since the Federal Government succeeded in hoodwinking
the public into believing that “withholding taxes” involved income taxes,
it was able to extend the scam to other forms of “withholding”; such
as from pension distributions, dividends, interest, the sales of stock,
gambling winnings, etc. etc. etc. However, once the public understands
that “wage withholding” has nothing to do with income taxes, but is actually
a “wage tax,” how can such a tax be “extended” to other sources of revenue.
So this case will also be the death knell to all other forms of “back up
withholding.”
So, now go forth and publicize the Brown case, and we will end the
income tax in short order.
For
More Information on this Case
Call: 1- 800 829-6666
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